According to various newspaper articles examined thus far, the time line is:
1985, Jean Edison Farrell bequeaths the IHR millions of dollars;
1991, Willis Carto goes to Switzerland to collect the cash;
October 1, 1993, Scientology gets tax exemption; also, Tom
Marcellus "sent a letter to Willis Carto advising the IHR founder that his
(Carto's) relationship with the IHR had been 'terminated'...";
February, 1995, Tom Marcellus discovers that Carto has committed a potential
crime and thus goes to the police with his suspicions;
June 1995,
the police raid Carto's house and upset his wife and dog;
June 1995,
the embezzlement charges fizzle once the prosecutor sees that the evidence
seized, even the autographed picture of Hitler, is not enough for a charge of
embezzlement. Carto sues, but fails to convince a court the search was
unconstitutional. Ever since then, Scientology has been celebrating this as a
big victory. One reason Carto may have sued is that he had some expert legal
testimony on the subject, including this 1979 legal memorandum on how
Scientology had its privacy violated during the FBI raids in 1977. Former
Scientologists may appreciate the legal concept that states if evidence was
seized from the accused by a third party, "the accused cannot
challenge the constitutionality of the seizure and the materials seized can be
used against him."
August 26, 1979
M E M O R A N D U M
RE: August 24, 1979 decision by District Court
Chief Judge William Bryant Concerning the Legality of a 1977 FBI Raid Upon the
Church
You have undoubtedly heard by now that Judge Bryant in Washington has ruled the 1977 FEI raid upon the Church here to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a "general exploratory seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment." We fully expect the government will appeal this decision and obviously the ballgame is not over. But having said that, I think this ruling is a very important one in several respects and I want to outline these to you.
About 60 years ago or so, the Supreme Court established what has come to be known as the "exclusionary rule". The court ruled that the use of unconstitutionally acquired evidence is itself unconstitutional. It is a decision which civil libertarian legal scholars cite as having put teeth into the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, the Fourth Amendment is reduced to a mere gesture if materials seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used in a court of law.
Then, in 1967 the Supreme Court started extracting those teeth. In that year searches for "mere evidence" of a crime became authorized. Prior to that time the police had been limited, even under valid warrants, to searching for and seizing the fruits of a crime (like stolen money), the instrumentalities of a crime (like a gun) and contraband (such as narcotics). Searches for "mere evidence" were considered illegal because: 1) such searches often became general rummaging searches, and 2) because they often sought to use a man's own words, contained in his private papers, against him - a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Last year, in the Stanford Daily newspaper case the Court removed any special protections for First Amendment groups against unannounced police raids. The ruling in the case was simply the logical extension of the voiding of the "mere evidence" rule, with this difference: in the Stanford case, the "mere evidence" sought was not in the possession of suspects, but in the possession of disinterested third parties who were not suspected of any crime. Such raids have a particular advantage to law-enforcement agencies because of a fine legal point. If evidence has been seized from the accused in a case, that person has the legal right to challenge the constitutionality of the seizure. However, if the evidence against the accused was seized from a third party, the accused cannot challenge the constitutionality of the seizure and the materials seized can be used against him.
But it was actually in 1976 that Fourth Amendment protections started becoming a thing of the past. The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant state "particularly" the place to be searched and the items to be seized. It is this element of "particularity" which lies at the heart of Fourth Amendment protections. "Particularity" is the dam which holds back the police state flood waters.
That dam was cracked effectively in 1976 in a Supreme Court ruling in a case known as Andresen v. Maryland. In that case, Maryland officials searched the corporate offices and the law offices of Peter C. Andresen with the purpose of seizing evidence that he had engaged in fraud in connection with the sale of real estate. But while the Supreme Court in 1967 had allowed searches for "mere evidence", the Court in Andresen upheld a search for evidence "at this time unknown" related to Andresen's alleged fraudulent sale of a particular piece of real estate.
It is precisely this "any evidence at this time unknown" loophole in the "particularity" requirement of the Fourth Amendment which makes it possible for the government to carry out raids as massive as those carried out against the Churches in Washington and Los Angeles. And when you come right down to it, it is the decisions in the Scientology raid cases which will ultimately determine whether or not we end up with any Fourth Amendment at all.
Bryant's decision, albeit not carved in stone, is important because it effectively saves the Fourth Amendment. That is its thrust. Bryant's ruling says, in effect: No, we must not allow the Fourth Amendment to pass into oblivion; the government should not be allowed to use the Andresen decision as a flail to shred the Fourth Amendment barrier against the onrush of a police state.
In Andresen an unconstitutional clause in a warrant was found to be permissable only because it applied to a very narrowly defined crime, the sale of a single specifically identified piece of property. The warrant used in the Scientology raids permitted agents to search for "any and all evidence (at this time unknown)" of the crime of "conspiracy".
It was on this basis that D.C. District Court Judge Bryant last year rejected the government's arguments that the Andresen decision was applicable to what the government had done in the Scientology warrants. Bryant observed that while the agents might have been able to identify items pertaining to the sale of a particularly named piece of property without using impermissable discretion, "try as the government might, the same cannot be said about a search for evidence of a conspiracy." According to Bryant,
"...evidence of conspiracy could also include evidence of any action taken by one of the accused confederates - no matter how trivial or manifestly innocuous on its face - that might somehow be connected to an agreement to commit the substantive offences, or be said to constitute an act in furtherance of such agreement.... Thus "evidence of conspiracy" is a virtually open-ended proposition."
Incredibly, this ruling of Bryant was reversed by the Appeals Court who remanded the action back to Bryant's court to decide whether or not the search itself was carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Bryant's latest ruling, handed down just last Friday, is as forceful and unequivocal ruling as we have seen in many years. It is an attempt, one of great clarity and conviction, to put the Fourth Amendment back on its feet. Consider the following excerptions:
"A survey of the inventory of items seized by the FBI agents reveals that these selection procedures led to the seizure of several hundred documents - nearly half or more of the seizure - which were not designated by the warrant; and by no stretch of the imagination could they be regarded as within the designated categories of documents to be seized. In effect the agents conducted a general seizure. The determination as to what items were relevant to the warrant was subsequently made by the prosecutors at a more leisurely pace after the seized documents had been transferred to their office.
"The government has decided to return the "innocuous" items voluntarily. One of its representatives claims, however, that these items are merely cumulative, and that their return says nothing about whether the documents are in fact evidence of crime. I find this explanation patently incredible and unworthy of belief.""Compliance with the Amendment is a relatively simple task, requiring nothing more than curbing one's curiosity and adhering to the directions contained in the warrant."
"The type of seizure here involved should be forcefully discouraged rather than condoned, and presents a prime target for the exclusionary rule.
Obviously the mere voluntary return of items deemed worthless by the prosecutor in no way serves the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and constitutes no sanction whatsoever. And if accepted as an adequate remedy in lieu of the suppression and return of the entire seizure, rather than having the effect of deterrence, it would instead constitute a breeding ground for more and more widespread abuse.
I do not believe there is any widespread tendency on the part of higher courts to accept such an empty gesture as adequate remedy for deliberate and unnecessary invasions of privacy in cases involving papers or wire communications....""I think it should be pointed out that it is one thing to neglect taking the appropriate action to avoid the feared deep intrusion into one's privacy such as occurs in a wiretap with no effort to minimize. It is quite another, and much more egregious matter, when-government agents engage in vigorous overt action which is specifically designed to subvert the protections which the Amendment seeks to afford, and which at the same time violates a specific statute enacted for the purpose of buttressing the specificity requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
As Bryant's initial ruling had rejected the government's argument that the warrant in Andresen offered a precedent for the Scientology warrants, so, in his second ruling, did he reject the government's arguments citing Andresen in support of the contention that "the recognized adequate remedy for such an illegal seizure is the voluntary return of the items deemed worthless to the prosecution's cause."
"I do not believe that the Court in Andresen intended to condone as a practice (a) the wholesale seizure and carting away of documents by officers who willfully exceed the scope of their authority under a warrant, and thus violate the law; 1 (b) a more leisurely screening and selection of those which are relevant by prosecutors in their offices; and then (c) the voluntary return of unwanted items. If this were so, then the manifested concern that private papers be accorded the fullest possible Fourth Amendment protection is meaningless."
Bryant is trying to reverse the trend in Fourth Amendment erosion which has, over the past few years, led to an epidemic of raids upon newspapers, churches and attorney offices. It is not a final ruling, but in every other respect it is a precedent - not in its opposition to the erosion of constitutional protections, for such opposition is not small or insignificant. It is precedential in that it is a finding of law which clearly seeks to give us back an enforceable Fourth Amendment. As such it deserves every possible support.
---
1. Bryant underscored this point in a footnote, citing 18 U.S.C., Section 2234:
"Whoever, in executing a search warrant, willfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than 51,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year."
EXCERPTION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN RE: Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977 for Premises Located at 2125 S Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C. (Founding Church of Scientology)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
by Judge William B. Bryant filed August 24, 1979
... by no stretch of the imagination could they be regarded as within the designated categories of documents to be seized. In effect the agents conducted a general seizure. page 5, #1.
The government has decided to return the "innocuous" items voluntarily. One of its representatives claims, however, that these items are merely cumulative, and that their return says nothing about whether the documents are in fact evidence of crime. I find this explanation patently incredible and unworthy of belief. page 5, #2
I do not believe that the Court in Andresen intended to condone as a practice (a.) the wholesale seizure and carting away of documents by officers who willfully exceed the scope of their authority under a warrant, and thus violate the law; (b) a more leisurely screening and selection of those which are relevant by prosecutors in their offices; and then (c) the voluntary return of unwanted items. If this were so, then the manifested concern that private papers be accorded the fullest possible Fourth Amendment protection is meaningless. page 6 and 7, #1
Compliance with the Amendment is a relatively simple task, requiring nothing more than curbing one's curiosity and adhering to the directions contained in the warrant. page 8, #1
The type of seizure here involved should be forcefully discouraged rather than condoned, and presents a prime target for the exclusionary rule. page 8, #2
And if accepted as an adequate remedy in lieu of the suppression and return of the entire seizure, rather than having the effect of deterrence, it would instead constitute a breeding ground for more and more widespread abuse. page 8, #3
I do not believe there is any widespread tendency on the part of higher courts to accept such an empty justure as adequate remedy for deliberate and unnecessary invasions of privacy in
EXCERPTION CONTINUED - -2
It is quite another, and much more egregious matter, when government agents engage in vigorous overt action which is specifically designed to subvert the protections which the Amendment seeks to afford,... page 9, #2
I wish to emphasize that the quantity of innocuous documents seized, though significant in assessing the depth of the unlawful intrusion, is not the determining factor in my concluding that the seizure is unreasonable. Rather, it is the stark fact that they were seized, in spite of the fact that they obviously were not included in any of the categories of items to be seized as contained in the warrant, and thus in flagrant violation of the statute (18 U.S.C.! 2234) which is designed to bolster the effectiveness of the particularization requirement of the Fourth Amendment. page 10, #1
Accordingly, the court hereby holds that the United States illegally and unconstitutionally executed this warrant and converted their seizure of documents into a general exploratory seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and of 18 U.S.C. & 2234.
# # # #
[stamped] FILED AUG 24 1979 JAMES f. DAVEY, Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
IN RE: Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977 for Premises Located at 2125 S Street, Northwest Washington, D. C.
Misc. No. 77-0151
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On July 8, 1977 agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a search of the Washington offices of the Founding Church of Scientology pursuant to a warrant which instructed them to search for numerous documents and evidence of conspiracy, obstruction of justice and theft of government property in violation of 1.8 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1503 and 641. The Church sought return of the property and a protective order against. the government's use of the documents seized. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed this court's ruling of July 27, 1977, that the warrant in this case was a general warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court remanded this action to this court to decide several issues which remained open:
that the search was conducted in a manner that constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment, that the agents employed unnecessary force in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3109; and the warrant was stale. [In Re: Search Warrant Dated Jul 4, 1977, 572. F.2d 321, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1977).]
At the hearing on these remaining contentions, some of the agents who participated in the search for and seizure of the documents gave vivid accounts of (1) the authority under which they seized documents they took from the Church offices; and (2) the manner in which they conducted their seizure, i.e... whether the documents were taken deliberately or by accident.
At about 8:45 a.m., twenty-five F.B.I. agents appeared at the Church premises. Entry was forced to rooms on the fourth floor which contained the Church files, and about fifteen of the agents sifted through documents until 7:00 p.m., a total of ten hours.
The warrant listed as items to be seized 148 specific documents and files allegedly stolen from government offices, a summary of certain grand jury testimony and twelve other documents and categories of documents believed to be evidence of alleged conspiracies. In addition, item number 162 authorized seizure of "any and all fruits, instrumentalities and evidence (at this time unknown) of the crimes of conspiracy, obstruction of justice and theft of government porperty [sic] in violation of 18 U.S. Code §§ 371, 1503 and 641 which facts recited in the accompanying affidavit make out."
Three agents who testified about their seizure of documents said they took documents under one of the more specific headings of the warrant (items 1 through 161); under the less specific item 162 which authorized the agents to seize "[a]ny and all fruits, instrumentalities and evidence (at this time unknown) of the crimes of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and theft of government porperty [sic] in violation of 18 U.S. Code 371, 1503 and 641 which facts recited in the accompanying affidavit make out"; or under the "plain view" doctrine. They also gave several explanations of how they decided to seize documents which did not fit within one of the specific categories listed on the warrant. For example, Agent J. F. Higgins said:
[F]or instance, we were told to try to get guardian orders -- relating to guardian order 1634 -- well, if I saw a compliance report to that guardian order, to my understanding of the crimes alleged, that seemed to establish a relationship to the item described in the generalized kind of description of an item that would be pertinent-_ [Tr. 216.]
At another point Higgins explained:
Well Your Honor, the items that I was having a little bit of question with were the items that were labelled Snow White or something of that nature. Then I would look into the -- I would read the document.over, and if it was something of that nature and there was a word in there that more or less, or a couple of words, or a phrase or a paragraph in there that indicated that that particular Snow White document pertained to what would be characterized as overt [sic] activity, I would take it. [Tr. 220.]
Higgins explained more fully later on:
[W]hen I saw items that related to Snow White, was working under the presumption that we were seeking evidence of criminal conduct, when Snow White is described in that affidavit as main program directed against governmental agencies -which means the main things that were not quite on the up and up . . . Because as I went over each document I read, understanding the violations that were being alleged, and I sought to see whether or not Snow White - that particular document that had Snow White on it -- meant or related to activities which would have appeared to be criminal. Tr. 224-225.]
Agent Joel Dean explained why he seized a pleading filed in a legal suit brought by Gregory Taylor. (He testified that he took the document under Item 162 of the warrant.)
The reason I chose this particular item to take during the search was that Gregory Taylor was present upon entering the Fourth Floor rear of the Scientology.. He was an individual who had access to that location. He was an individual, who I think -- as I remember, I guess it was IRS had arrested him, mistaking that he was a Mr. Wolff.
This, indeed, showed that the Church of Scientology had an interest in him. ... The fact that he was on the premises in the area that secured papers were located, and that the church had an interest in him as an individual, it was my estimation that he could certainly have been a participant in the church's plan to obstruct justice in regard to the theft of Government property. [Tr. 279.]
Dean also testified that a number of documents were seized under the plain view doctrine.
Computer Number 50287. This is a document pertaining to codes. I seized it under the plain-view doctrine. It's a listing of codes -- codes for different terms, names, and words. ... I'm telling you that the reason this was seized is because it would be a valuable key into the entire 161 items to understand them in their entirety.
THE COURT: So you chose that item, not on the basis of anything in the list, but on the basis -- Well, you fancied it to be important?
THE WITNESS: It's a listing of codes, and knowing the other 161 items could have codes, and after reading this, I selected this and seized this so we could interpret the other items that were seized in regard to the affidavit. [Tr. 323-325.]
Dean said that he had seized 14 of the inventoried documents as a package of
codes under the plain view doctrine. Tr. 339.
Agent Charles Booth testified
about his seizure of a document which was labeled with a large "SW" on
the top and which he took according to items 152, 155 and 156 of the warrant.
It has got "SW" on the top of it, I think. That to me meant "Snow White" ... and which was listed in the search warrant, it says, "Utilize BI for help in leads for discovery." "BI" meant to me, the Bureau of Information ... of the Church of Scientology. Which I construed to mean that.the Scientologists were attempting to put a source within the FBI to obtain any information that they couldn't get or did not get under the Freedom of Information.... But it would fall under the category of the operation that the Scientologists have utilized, I believe. I believe it is Guardian Order 1361. [Tr. 504-505.]
A survey of the inventory of items seized by the F.B.I. agents reveals that
these selection procedures led to the seizure of several hundred documents -
nearly half or more of the seizure--which were not designated by the warrant;
and by no stretch of the imagination could they be regarded as within the
designated categories of documents to be seized. In effect the agents conducted
a general seizure. The determination as to what items were relevant to the
warrant was subsequently made by the prosecutors at a more leisurely pace after
the seized documents had been transferred to their office.
The government
has decided to return the "innocuous" items voluntarily. One of its
representatives claims, however, that these items are merely cumulative, and
that return says nothing about whether the documents are in fact evidence of
crime. I find this explanation patently incredible and unworthy of belief. This,
especially in light of the fact that other members of the United States
Attorney's office have represented to the court that fully half of the documents
which were seized were innocuous, meaning they held no criminal connotation.
1
-
1 - Assistant United States Attorney Brian Shaughnessy told this court on July 27, 1977:
Your Honor, copies have been made of, I would say about 75 per cent of the two boxes of documents. That represents the fifty per cent approximately -- I don't know the exact percentage, but whatever percentage it was that was going to be. retained, and those documents that were on closer examination found not to be relevant to the anticipated criminal proceedings were to be returned. [Tr. 7.]
Assistant United States Attorney Garey Stark stated in open court on August 12, 1977:
I do recall, however, during that period of time when I was fairly intimately involved in the developments of this investigation that a perusal, which took place as quickly as possible after the seizure of such seized documents was made by members of our office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it was the judgment of the people making that perusal that -- I may be incorrect, but I think approximately 40 or 50 per cent of the items seized would fall into a category, which in the opinion of the prosecutors would not be used in any criminal investigation.
THE COURT: That is what they call innocuous documents?
MR. STARK: Innocuous or whatever adjectives are appropriate. I don't know. I see no reason why documents which fall into that category can not be returned. [Tr. 3.]
But in any event the contention is made that the recognized adequate remedy for such an illegal seizure is the voluntary return of the items deemed worthless to the prosecution's cause. Cited as authority for this proposition is United States v. Forsythez, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977), which in turn directs attention to Justice Blackmun's observations set out in footnote, 11 of the Court's opinion in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 (1976), as support for this view. However, I do not believe that the Court in Andresen intended to condone as a practice (a) the wholesale seizure and carting away o£ documents by officers who willfully exceed the scope o5 their authority under a warrant, and thus violate the law;2 (b) a more leisurely screening and selection of those which
-
2 - 18 U.S.C. § 2234 provides:
Whoever, in executing a search warrant, willfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year.
are relevant by prosecutors in their offices; and then (c) the voluntary return of unwanted items. If this were so, then the manifested concern that private papers be accorded the fullest possible Fourth Amendment protection is meaningless. I think it significant in this regard that Justice Blackmun recognized the fact that: "In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized," Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11 (emphasis added). This obviously does not imply acceptance of the proposition that it is certain that such innocuous documents will be seized and carried away after examination, cursory or otherwise, reveals that they are clearly not contemplated under the warrant.
As I read the same footnote in Andresen, the lower federal courts are admonished to be particularly sensitive to guarding against unwarranted encroachments on the consti tutionally protected right of privacy involved in a document search. And it suggests a rational line of approach to the problem when it analogizes a document search to a wiretap, and cautioned that they should be conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions.
In 1968 when Congress authorized the surreptitious interception of wire communications it at the same time recognized the deep intrusiveness of wiretapping and electronic surveillance upon individuals' personal privacy. This concern is reflected in the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) which provides that any seizure of conversations "be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter."
It appears that the Fourth Amendment's requirement a warrants "particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" can fairly be equated to the wiretap statute's "minimization requirement." Central to the purpose of both is the protection of individual privacy from unreasonable infringement on the part of government. The only patent difference between the two provisions is that one (the Fourth Amendment requirement) is much more easily managed than the other. Compliance with the Amendment is a relatively simple task, requiring nothing more than curbing one's curiosity and adhering to the directions contained in the warrant.
The type of seizure here involved should be forcefully discouraged rather than condoned, and presents a prime target for the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court stated the objectives of this sanction in succinct terms in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976):
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any "(r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect ...." United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.
Obviously the mere voluntary return of items deemed worthless by the prosecutor in no way serves the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and constitutes no sanction whatsoever. And if accepted as an adequate remedy in lieu of the suppression and return of the entire seizure, rather than having the effect of deterrence, it would instead constitute a breeding ground for more and more widespread abuse.
I do not believe there is any widespread tendency on the part of higher courts to accept such an empty jesture as adequate remedy for deliberate and unnecessary invasions of privacy in cases involving papers or wire communications, although one circuit has in fact taken that view, United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), in a case involving the minimization clause of the wiretap statute. It is interesting to note, however, that the trial court in Sisca v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) rejected defendant's contention that incriminating communications should be suppressed on account of the failure to minimize. The motion was denied on two grounds. The court pointed out that it was denied as not timely filed under the terms of the statute; but then went on to decide that regardless of its untimeliness, the motion should be denied because suppression of the entire wiretap is not warranted by violation of.the minimization requirement. However, in affirming on appeal the Second Circuit Court of Appeals specifically pointed out that its affirmance was based on the timeliness issue and not on the question of the appropriate remedy. 503 F.2d 1337. Our own circuit, though hinting what its views might be,. specifically avoided resolution of the issue. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135 n.10 (1978).
I think it should be pointed out that it is one thing to neglect taking the appropriate action to avoid the feared deep intrusion into one's privacy such as occurs in a wiretap with no effort to minimize. It is quite another, and much more egregious matter, when government agents engage in vigorous overt action which is specifically designed to subvert the protections which the Amendment seeks to afford, and which at the same time violates a specific statute enacted for the purpose of buttressing the specificity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
I wish to emphasize that the quantity of innocuous documents seized, though significant in assessing the depth of the unlawful intrusion, is not the determining factor in my concluding that the seizure is unreasonable. Rather, it is the stark fact that they were seized, in spite of the fact that they obviously were not included in any of the categories of items to be seized as contained in the warrant, and thus in flagrant violation of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 2234) which is designed to bolster the effectiveness of the particularization requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, the court hereby holds that the United States illegally and unconstitutionally executed this warrant and converted their seizure of documents into a general exploratory seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and of 18 U.S.C. § 2234.
The court rules against petitioner on all other grounds.
Upon consideration of the above, the court ORDERS that the government,
forthwith:
(1) return to petitioner all materials seized on July 8, 1977 in
a search of petitioner's S Street premises by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation under a July 4, 1977 warrant, except stolen items;
(2)
destroy any and all copies of said items in its possession or control; and
(3) retrieve and destroy all copies of any materials so seized, which have been
disseminated to any person outside the Fraud Section of the United States
Attorney's Office.
And it further ORDERS
That any items seized during the course of this illegal search, be, and it is suppressed as evidence, and shall not be admissible at any hearing or trial,
August 24, /sig/1979 William B.Bryant/
United States District Judge