Title: Solicitor Moxon's Malady
(part one)
Author: Keith Henson <hkhenson@netcom3.netcom.com>
Date: 19 Apr 2000 02:58:58 GMT
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
This motion presents a clash between American constitutional and
jurisprudence notions of fair play and scientology policies of fair
game On July 19, 1999, Kendrick Moxon, Esq. ("Moxon") of Moxon &
Kobrin, in-house counsel for Church of Scientology International
("Scientology") was awarded sanctions against Movant herein, Graham E.
Berry ("Berry") after Moxon's Rule 11 motion was granted on April 15,
1999. The gravamen of Moxon's successful motion for Rule 11 sanctions
inter alia was that Pattinson's complaint frivolously alleged "that Mr.
Moxon participated in various of the criminal, fraudulent, and unethical
activities alleged [therein]." (See First Amended Complaint ¶54, Third
Amended Complaint ¶11, 12, 19, 42(f), 54.)
The Court concluded, in its April 15, 1999 order that [Berry]
acted in bad faith by pursuing meritless claims against defendant Moxon
in this action." On July 19, 1999, Berry was sanctioned in the amount of
$28,000.
On June 10, 1999, after the Rule 11 order, and after the briefing
on the sanctions award had been concluded, Berry was contacted by Robert
Cipriano, an old acquaintance from New York who had recently rejoined
Alcoholics Anonymous and, following their 12-step program, needed to make
amends to Berry who had also recently affiliated with AA. On August 9,
1999, and September 26, 1999, Cipriano, through two separate
Declarations, provided the evidence Berry needed to prove that Moxon,
had, in fact, participated in various criminal, fraudulent and unethical
activities on behalf of his client, Scientology. (Cipriano Appendix
Exhibits B and C.)
As more fully set forth in Cipriano Appendix Exhibit B, page 15,
para. 43, Cipriano testified that in April/May, 1998 he been offered
around $750,000 by Moxon for further perjured and libelous testimony
against Berry for the purpose of ruining Berry's professional and
personal reputation and destroying his financial, health and mental
stability. (Cipriano Appendix Exhibit C, ¶7-13,Exhibit 1.Berry Decl.Exh. 2)
The scheme worked. Berry eventually filed for bankruptcy on June
11, 1999. In October, 1999, he took in-house corporate employment and
began winding down his remaining legal practice on the express advice of
his psychiatrist who believed that the stress of the Scientology
litigation was the root of his severe depression and suicidal ideation,
and that he should, at least temporarily relieve himself of the stress of
full time trial lawyering. (Berry Decl.¶_14, Exh. 1).
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although Moxons misconduct arguably taints these entire
proceedings, this motion does not seek reconsideration of any of the
courts prior rulings. Instead, Berry contends that the sanctity of the
justice system, the equitable principles underpinning Rule 60 (b), and
the inherent jurisdiction of this court, demand that the Rule 11
memorandum order of April 15,1999, and the Rule 11 sanctions order of
July 19,1999, be vacated nunc pro tunc since they were won by Moxon, an
officer of the court, who waged what amounts to psychological warfare and
a criminal campaign against Berry, aided by an unlimited
Scientology-funded war chest that included the offer of over $750,000 for
bribes and the actual payment of at least several hundred thousand
dollars laundered through a non-profit section 501 (c) corporation
incorporated by Moxon for this specific purpose . (Cipriano Appendix,
Exhibit B, ¶ 43, 46, 47-101, Exhs. 8-11,14-17,20-50;Exh.
B,¶10-15,Exh.1.) Despite all of the subterfuge, all of the money came
from or through Moxon, was spent entirely on Ciprianos business and
living expenses, and not one thin dime was ever distributed for a
charitable purpose.
III. SUMMARY OF FACTS
During the pendancy of this lawsuit alone, Moxons corroborated criminal
conduct, directed at Berry, included violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621,
1603, 1503, 1512, 371 2(a), 2(b) (perjury, obstruction of justice,
witness and evidence tampering, conspiracy, aiding and abetting and the
use of an intermediary). Specifically, Moxon's fraudulent acts committed
in conjunction with and the furtherance of this action included: (1) The
May 5th, 1994 presentation of the first Cipriano Declaration with
numerous fabrications and exaggerated statements regarding Graham Berry's
sexual history to Robert Cipriano, which Cipriano was forced to sign
under duress and the coercive threats of attorney Moxons agent Ingram
(Cipriano Decl, ¶ 20); (2) The use of less than candid investigators to
obtain information and the subsequent use of that information obtained
through the practice of intimidation and coercion (Id. at ¶¶ 14-20,
23-28); (3) The deposition preparation of Cipriano by Moxon on June 29th,
1998 during which Moxon (later Samuel D. Rosen, Esq.) instructed Cipriano
to lie about the ages of Berry's sexual relationships, violated of Rule
3-210 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and C.C.P. §1209(8) (Id. at ¶
50) [18 U.S.C. §§371, 1512, 2(B), 1503, 1621 AND 1623 (conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, witness and evidence tampering, perjury]; (4) The
further testimonial preparation of Cipriano by Moxon comprised of
instructions to lie on June 30th, 1998, also in violation of Rule 3-210
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and C.C.P. §1209(8) (Id. at ¶ 50);
(5) Violating the oath taken by all attorneys at law under Business and
Professions Code §6067, in which attorneys promise " faithfully to
discharge the duties of any attorney at law to the best of his knowledge
and ability," violating C.C.P. §1209(3); (6) The unlawful business
dealings between attorney and client prohibited by Rule 5-200 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and C.C.P. §1209(8), undertaken in order to
maintain Cipriano's livelihood in exchange for perjurious testimony
against Berry; (7) the promise of up to three quarters of a million
dollar ($750,000) donation to the Moxon/Scientology-founded charity, Day
of the Child (Id. at ¶ 47); (8) The provision of a $2,500 loan to
Cipriano (Id. at ¶47); (9) The provision for Cipriano's room and board at
Joanne Wheaton's Franklin House (Id. at ¶ 49); (10) The rental of a Palm
Springs condominium, a five bedroom Palm Springs home complete with
swimming pool and monthly provisions for Cipriano's board and living
expenses by the law firm of Moxon & Kobrin (Id. at ¶ 59); (11) The
provision by Moxon, at no cost to Cipriano, of a $20,000 lawyer in New
Jersey to clear and expunge Cipriano's criminal record (Id. at ¶ 60);
(12) The subsequent provision of settlement monies in the amount of
$1,500 [Id. At ¶]; (13) Moxon's provision of legal services to
incorporate Cipriano's "Day of the Child" Charity in Nevada, (Id. at ¶¶
61-63); (14) Moxon's provision of a new Saturn automobile for Cipriano on
October 6, 1998 (Id. at ¶ 67); and Moxon's provision of a Packard-Bell
computer for Cipriano at a cost of $1,000 [Id at ¶79 ].
IV. SUMMARY OF THE LAW
Berry relies upon Rule 60(b) for the following reasons: (1) The
judgment is void because it was procured through a fraud upon this court;
(2) that the Cipriano revelations are newly discovered evidence; and, (3)
this motion is timely made.
Moreover, Berry relies upon the equitable principal that Moxon's
actions constitute [very] unclean hands and to reward him for his
"out-lawyering" and unlimited slush fund makes a mockery of our system of
law.
Finally, Berry contends that the threshold test, that the
exercise of the court's discretion not be an empty exercise, is easily
met in the "unusual" circumstances herein. First, Berry has been forced
into bankruptcy, which is still pending as Moxon has brought several
adversary proceedings in that action. Second, Moxon used the language of
this Courts Order as a principal reason for having Berry declared a
vexatious litigant and an appeal against that order is about to
commence. Third, and even more importantly, the actions of Moxon, on
behalf of his client Scientology, are so despicable that to allow the
sanctions order to stand, in effect, condones their belief that "the end
justifies the means." This belief was firmly rejected by this country's
founding fathers as evidenced by the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and
has consistently been rejected, as evidenced by the current Ramparts
scandal.
V. ARGUMENT
A. RULE 60(B) IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS HEREIN
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 60(b) which provides, in pertinent
part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud: ETC. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or partys legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect: (2) newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether hitherto denominated intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other conduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;(5) the judgment has been satisfied,released,or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reason (1), (2), and (3) not more than
one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken
This motion has been made within a reasonable time and within a
year of the entry of the Rule 11 order herein. (Berry Decl. ¶ 8 ©-(e),
11-17. ) Moreover, this motion is also made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4),
(5) and (6) to which the one-year limitation period does not apply. In
addition, the full extent of Moxons criminal conduct has yet to be
revealed. Indeed, it continues to this day with defendant and Ingram
allegedly attempting to intimidate the States witnesses in the Hurtado v
Berry case. Moxon and Ingram have been most recently directing this
conduct at the Los Angeles District Attorneys witnesses in People v.
Hurtado, Berry Decl. Exh. 11, pp.5:4-19
For instance, in January 1998 Moxon unlawfully solicited the legal
representation of Cipriano when Mr. Berry sued him for defamation.
(Second Cipriano Decl. ¶ 23-43.) He again unlawfully used intermediaries
to this end. (Second Cipriano Decl. ¶¶ 23-24.) 18 U.S.C. section 2 (b).
He embarked upon a further conspiracy. (Second Cipriano Decl. ¶ 28);
Third Cipriano Decl. ¶¶__, Exh. _. 18 U.S.C. section 371. He aided and
abetted the making of further perjuries statements in both filed
declarations and depositions. (Second Cipriano Decl ¶¶ 28); (Third
Cipriano Decl.¶¶7-15). 18 U.S.C.section 2(a). He made related, relevant
and knowingly false statements to this court that were intended to
prejudice the court against Mr. Berry and to influence the court into
issuing the sanctions against Mr. Berry that he then used in other forums
to drive Mr. Berry from the active practice of law where he had been such
a pain in the butt to Moxons client/organization.18 U.S.C.1621 &1623. (
Berry Decl ¶ 8(d), 11,12,14-16, Exhs. 1,2,4, 6-11). Also concurrent with
the proceedings herein, consistent with the allegations against him
herein, and contrary to his express oral and written representations to
this court, Moxon engaged in witness tampering and the obstruction of
justice. (Second Cipriano Decl. ¶ 23-101; Berry Decl. Exh. 5 p.
6:11-14:18; Exh. 11, p. 5:4-19). 18 U.S.C. sections 1503 & 1512.
Moxon and Ingram have been most recently directing this conduct at the
Los Angeles District Attorneys witnesses in People v. Hurtado. (Berry
Decl. Exh. 11, p.5:4-19). However, such documented and corroborated
criminal conduct is no less serious when it occurs during the course of
civil proceedings such as happened during those herein. Indeed, the
U.S.Department of Justice often prosecutes for perjury and related
criminal conduct that occurs during civil proceedings. Indeed, in United
States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040,1047 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1109 (1994) the court held that the perjury statute applies without
distinction both to perjury committed in a civil proceeding and to
perjury committed in a criminal prosecution.
B. THIS MOTION SATISFIES ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 60(b).
This motion presents clear and convincing evidence to support the
relief requested herein. The arguments are supported by clearly
applicable law and the allegations are corroborated by the recanted
testimony of Moxons former client Robert Cipriano and fifty relevant
documents-many of them bearing Moxons signature. Cipriano did not come
forward until after the court issued its first ruling that the
allegations in the complaints herein, as against Moxon, were asserted in
bad faith and just before this court rewarded Moxons criminal conduct by
awarding him sanctions in the amount of $28,000 against Mr. Berry. Rule
60(b) (1) and (2). Applicable authority holds that Moxons conduct against
Mr. Berry was inter alia fraud (whether intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party [including
fraud upon the court]. Rule 60(b) (3). Because of Moxons misconduct
herein, and while procuring the sanctions opinion (April 15,1999) and the
sanctions order herein (July 19,1999), the said orders [judgment] are
voidable/void. Rule 60 (b) (4). Moreover, because of the conduct
described and documented herein, and the manner in which Moxon continues
to use this courts April 15, 1999 and July 19, 1999 orders it is no
longer equitable that the [orders] should have prospective application.
Rule 60 (b) (5). For all of these reasons, and the health of Mr. Berry
which was demonstrably and adversely affected by Moxons six year fair
game operation against Mr. Berry, relief from the operation of the
[orders] is also justified. Rule 60 (b) (6). (Berry Decl. ¶¶ 8-12;
14-19).
Accordingly, Rule 60(b) recognizes this courts inherent power to
grant relief from judgment where this court has been subjected to fraud
so grave that relief is afforded without regard to any arbitrary time
limitation. See generally: Hazel Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 US
238, 88 L Ed 1250,64 S Ct 997 (1944), Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co.,
125 F2d 213 (9th Cir. 1942). Indeed, it was not until June 1999, that
Cipriano terminated his particular role in the Moxon, Rosen, Ingram and
Scientology conspiracy by communicating with an initially suspicious
Berry and finally executed the Second Cipriano Declaration on August 9,
1999, and the Third Cipriano Declaration on September 26, 1999. (Berry
Decl. ¶ 17.) In that regard it is noteworthy that Cipriano was also
involved with the obstruction of justice by Moxon and Ingram in the
Hurtado case by helping to locate and bribe a street hustler, Anthony
Abodeca, into giving perjured testimony against Berry. (Cipriano Appendix
,Exh.B, ¶84-85.) Apodeca has just been released from prison where he was
served with a subpoena for his deposition. Hurtado is currently in prison
again, where he will soon be deposed. A motion to preserve the Cipriano
and Moxon documents is pending in State Court. (Berry Decl ¶18, Exh.12)
Accordingly, the full extent of Moxons corruption is still to be
revealed.
Consequently, the fraud on the court that Defendant Moxon was
perpetrating during this litigation, and which was only discovered after
the ruling on his Rule 11 motion herein, continues to be perpetrated upon
the court (s) and Berry, and should operate as a waiver, estoppel and
tolling event in connection with the Rule 60(b) limitation periods.
C. THE VACATING OF THE RULE 11 ORDER IS A NECESSARY NOT AN EMPTY
EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION
In addition, Berry satisfies the threshold test that the
exercise of this courts discretion will not be an empty exercise.
Marderosian v. Shamshak, 170 FRD 335 (DC Mass. 1997). The Rule 11 0rder
herein forced Mr. Berry into a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy filing. Moxon filed
an Adversary Proceeding to have the Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Berry
ruled non-dischargeable on the ground that Berry acted maliciously
against him herein and therefore engaged in intentional tortuous conduct
throughout this proceeding. (Berry Decl. Exh. ¶12, Exh. 6) If this Court
does not grant Mr. Berry the relief sought herein, the Moxon v. Berry
bankruptcy court trial commences on June 26, 2000, Moxon has filed
another adversary proceeding on behalf of Hurtado and tried to file on
behalf of Scientologist Glenn Barton. Moxon was also responsible for the
filing of a California State Bar complaint against Mr. Berry on the basis
the Rule 11 order herein. That complaint is still pending. (Berry Decl .¶
15.) Finally, Moxon used the Rule 11 Order, and the Courts opinion
herein, as a major basis for a legally and factually unsupported
vexatious litigant ruling against Berry. An appeal against that ruling is
about to proceed. (Berry Decl. Exh. 7-10.) Thus, the effect of this
Courts Rule 11 order and opinion, in the hands of Moxon, has been to ruin
Berry professionally and financially and to drive from the active and
private practice of law. (Berry Decl. ¶ 8(d), Exhs. 1-11, Exh. A-C..)
Accordingly, the exercise of this courts discretion in favor of
Berry will not be an empty exercise .On the contrary, it will assist
Berry to try and undo some of the wrongs Moxon has perpetrated upon him
with his use of this Courts Rule 11 order as sword with which to totally
destroy Berrys 25-year legal career. Surely this was not the intended
effect of this courts order, and the language of its opinion,
particularly in light of the real facts now known to this court.
Moxon actively concealed those facts from this court as part of his
despicable to stop Berry from litigating against his Scientology
organization to which he had been a pain in the butt. (Berry Decl. ¶ 4.)
No imaginable order or opinion now issuing from this court will ever undo
the damage and distress that the Rule 11 order and opinion herein,
procured by Moxon in the course of his amply corroborated criminal
conduct, has permanently caused Berry. By vacating the Rule 11, it will
enable Berry to try and undo some of the damage Moxon has done with it.
Amazingly, he has even injected himself into litigation where he is not
of record and where he has used this courts opinion and order to try and
prejudice Berry and one of his former clients before this Central
District, which Berry once represented, pro bono in Standing Committee v.
Yagman. (Berry Decl. ¶ 16, Exh.10.) Surely it was not this courts
intention to give Moxon the specific language in its written opinion, and
an order, to hang around Berry neck, like a dead albatross, and with
which to pursue him like some modern day Inspector Javier, quickly
driving him from his profession of twenty-five years practice, in five
different jurisdictions.
Moreover, the court must exercise its discretion under Rule 60(b)
in accordance with equitable principles. United States v Southwest Nat.
Bank, 598 F2d. 600 (Em Ct App 1979), Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F2d 332 (8th
Cir. 1947). As shown herein, Moxon comes to this court with demonstrably
unclean hands and so the court must exercise its discretion in favor of
Berry.
D. MOXON'S FRAUD AND UNCLEAN HANDS WARRANTS THE VACATING OF THE RULE 11
ORDER
The Doctrine of fraud upon the court is solely concerned with the
integrity of the judicial process. Where the charges implicate counsel
they implicate the integrity of the judicial process. Kerwit Medical
Products Inc. N & H Instruments, 27 FR Serv 2d 250 (ND Tex 1978), affd
616 F2d 833 (5th Cir.), 207 USPQ 625, 29 FR Serv 2d 1190. Since attorneys
are officers of court, their allegedly dishonest conduct involving
misrepresentation and perjury would constitute fraud on the court.
H.K.Porter Co. v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F2d 1115 (6th Cir.Ohio
1976), 191 USPQ 481, 21 FR Serv 2d 1429. If attorney was implicated in
fabrication of evidence by party, such implication would constitute fraud
upon the court. United States V. International Tel. & Tel.Corp. 349 F
Supp 22 (DC Conn 1972), affd without opp 410 US 919,35 L Ed 2d 582, 93 S
Ct 1363(1973).If there was corruption on part of officers of court, court
was under duty to take whatever action might be appropriate to sustain
its integrity and to undo any resulting harm or injustice. Chicago Title
& Trust Co. Fox Theatres Corp. 182 F Supp 18 (SD NY 1960).
Ciprianos belated but still timely decision to recant and finally tell
the truth, and to testify about Moxons smorgasbord of corruption and
criminality directed at Berry during the pendancy of this litigation,
corroborated by at least 50 exhibits (many emanating from, or signed by,
Moxon himself, clearly and convincingly evidences the infection and
contamination that attorney Moxon has wrought upon every forum in which
Moxon has appeared against Berry since the blackmailing of Cipriano on
May 4-5, 1994. (Cipriano App. Exh B, ¶14-20).. Lawyers are agents
(technically officers) of the courts, Norton v. Hines (1975) 123 Cal.
Rptr. 237, 241, 49 C. A. 3rd 917, and the courts are a branch of the
government. Article III, United States Constitution, Article VI,
California Constitution. Lawyers, therefore, are an extension of the
judiciary branch of government, whether state or federal. Moreover,
there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to practice law, In re
Investigation of Conduct of Examination For Admission to Practice Law 1
Cal. 2d 61, 67, Cohen v. Wright 22 Cal. 293, 317, only reconfirms and
solidifies this conclusion. Legal practice is a privilege bestowed by
the legislature and courts upon persons in accordance with rules,
regulations and standards strictly defined by them.
Fundamental to a person's conduct in executing the duties and
obligations relative to the office of attorney is the duty of that person
to observe and uphold the law. Conversely, Moxon has violated Rule
8.4(b) by committing the criminal acts listed in the Appendix, Rule
8.4(c) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, and Rule 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Moxon violated Rule
1-400(C) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by making a solicitation on
behalf of an attorney or law firm to a prospective client with whom the
attorney or law firm has no family or prior professional relationship,
and further, in violation of Rule 1-400(D)(5), transmitting a
solicitation in such a way as to involve intrusion, coercion, duress,
compulsion, intimidation, threats, and vexatious and harassing conduct.
It requires no leap of reason, logic or imagination to conclude that
violation of the law in the execution of one's duties and obligations in
the privileged office of attorney, whether absent a client's knowledge
and consent, or at the behest and urging of a client (such as Moxon's
Scientology client herein), is a violation of the oath and the court
order bestowing on that person the privilege of legal practice.
Likewise, such practices violate applicable Rules of Conduct forbidding
deceitful, fraudulent, or misleading behavior and crimes of moral
turpitude. Assuming the violator acted in an effort to gain unfair
advantage in the proceeding and prevail over his or her opponent, as
happened here, the issue then becomes one of what impact such a violation
has upon the instant proceedings in light of those in which the violator
acted unlawfully.
As early as 1993, Moxon (acting in his official capacity as
officer of the court and in connection with his representation of
Scientology) commenced a pattern and practice of criminal conduct,
directed specifically at Berry, in violation of numerous sections of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Business and Professions Code,
the California Penal Code and the California Code of Civil Procedure, as
well as numerous sections of the U.S. Code. [including 18 US.C. §§ 1621m
1623m 1503, 1512, 371, 2(a), and 2(b)] (Berry Decl. ¶ 4, Exh.4) These
violations are so numerous that to review them in detail herein would
require a memorandum far in excess of the twenty-five-page limit. The
violations reached their zenith during the pendancy of this lawsuit when
attorney Moxon was saying one thing on the courts record and doing the
exact opposite outside of the courtroom. At a minimum, the totality of
the numerous violations directed, by Moxon, at Berry, since 1993,
include impersonating a police officer, intimidation, coercion,
extortion, solicitation, bribery, witness tampering, perjury, subornation
of perjury, blackmail, collusion, obstruction of justice, mail fraud,
wire fraud, malicious prosecution, vexatious litigation, stalking,
wiretapping, invasion of privacy, libel, slander, bankruptcy fraud,
insurance fraud, and fraud upon the courts (given the fact that Moxon has
actually filed perjurious documents in various courts) and conspiracy to
commit all of the foregoing.
VI. CONCLUSION
This motion presents clear and convincing evidence to support the
relief requested herein. The arguments are supported by clearly
applicable law and the allegations are corroborated by the recanted
testimony of Moxons former client Robert Cipriano, and fifty relevant
documents--many of them bearing Moxons signature or name. Cipriano did
not come forward until after the court issued its first ruling that the
allegations in the complaints herein, as against Moxon, were asserted in
bad faith and just before this court rewarded Moxons criminal conduct by
awarding him sanctions in the amount of $28,000 against Berry. Rule
60(b) (1) and (2). Applicable authority holds that Moxons conduct against
Berry was inter alia fraud (whether intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party [including
fraud upon the court]. Rule 60(b) (3). Because of Moxons misconduct
herein, and while procuring the sanctions opinion (April 15,1999) and the
sanctions order herein (July 19, 1999), the said orders [judgment] are
voidable/void. Rule 60 (b) (4). Moreover, because of the conduct
described and documented herein, and the manner in which Moxon continues
to use this courts April 15, 1999 and July 19, 1999 orders It is no
longer equitable that the [orders] should have prospective application.
Rule 60(b) (5). For all of these reasons, and the health of Berry which
was demonstrably and adversely affected by Moxons six year fair game
operation against Mr. Berry, relief from the operation of the [orders] is
also justified. Rule 60 (b) (6). (Cipriano App. Exhs. A-C; Berry Decl. ¶
2-19, Exhs.1-12.)
Finally, the fifty different documents corroborating Ciprianos
shocking testimony are explicit, credible and overwhelming. Were any
ordinary citizen, or any other lawyer but Moxon to have engaged in a mere
fraction of Moxons lawlessness, they would be immediately arrested and
easily convicted. Accordingly, and at the very least, the fruits of
Moxons misconduct, the April 15, 1999 and July 19, 1999 court orders
herein should be vacated nunc pro tunc.
Dated: April 14, 2000 Respectfully submitted,
_______________________
GRAHAM E. BERRY
Movant